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Abstract
The point of our study is to investigate, using both theoretical and archival empirical meth-
ods, the role of CEO career concerns as a determinant of earnings management behavior.
The significance of earnings management in market economies is well documented. Our in-
vestigations are motivated by the disconnect between recent survey evidence documenting
that executives prioritize implicit contracting (i.e., labor market) concerns when making
earnings management decisions (Graham et al (2005)) and the extant academic literature’s
focus on explicit contracting explanations. We first develop a model of earnings manage-
ment, rooted in career concerns, that alternatively incorporates the features of the accrual
accounting performance measurement system and the negative value-destroying effects of
real activities earnings management. Our model leads to the surprising prediction that,
absent explicit compensation contracts, managers do not engage in income-increasing earn-
ings management early in their careers. By contrast, later career stage CEOs are “trapped”
into managing earnings upward even though the market correctly foresees this classic type
of “signal jamming.” Consistent with this, we present robust new empirical evidence that
CEO age is a statistically and economically significant determinant of real activities and
accruals-based earnings management levels. After numerous robustness tests to discrimi-
nate between our hypothesis and alternative explanations for the significance of CEO age,
we conclude that implicit career stage incentives are important determinants of corporate
earnings management. Our findings are consistent with executives’ self-insights regarding
their behavior, while also suggesting that CEO age may be a significant correlated omitted
variable in prior academic earnings management studies.
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1 Introduction
Executives seem to face intense incentives to manage earnings, either in the form of accruals
manipulations or by choosing real activities to attain an earnings benchmark.1 Most of the ex-
tant academic literature links these incentives for earnings management, directly or indirectly,
to explicit contracts.2 While explicit contracting-based incentives clearly play an important
role, the empirical archival literature to date has been almost silent on the effects of implicit
contracts and implicit incentives over earnings management.3 However, a recent survey by
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) documents that more than three quarters of responding
executives consider upward mobility in the labor market (i.e., an implicit career concerns based
incentive) to be more important than short-run current compensation benefits in influencing
their earnings management decisions. Our study addresses the apparent disconnect between
this survey evidence regarding the importance of implicit contracts and the extant literature’s
focus on explicit contracting explanations for earnings management. We do so by investigat-
ing, both theoretically and using archival empirical data, the role of executive career concerns
in the determination of corporate earnings management activities. We provide new and robust
evidence that younger CEOs engage in less real activities and accruals-based income-increasing
earnings management, even after controlling for explicit incentives and other factors that are
known to be associated with earnings management. Our findings are consistent with execu-
tives’ own self-insights and highlight the economically significant role played by CEOs’ implicit
career concerns in determining real activities and accruals based earnings management choices.
To motivate our empirical investigations, we first develop a model of earnings manage-
ment that extends the seminal career concerns work of Holmstrom (1982, 1999) to incorporate
features of the accrual accounting performance measurement system and the longer-term value-
1Some prominent examples of non-academic sources of attention to the issue of earnings management pres-
sures include the famous speeches by Levitt (1998, 2003), as well as many articles from the popular press. An
excellent and extensive academic summary is provided by Ronen and Yaari (2008).
2Contracting-based motives for earnings management that have been examined include executive current
cash bonus maximization (Healy 1985), the avoidance of debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo
1994), more favorable equity pricing (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a and 1998b), political cost considerations
(Key 1997), and executive equity compensation (Cheng and Warfield 2005).
3One exception is the study by Bowen, DuCharme and Shores (1995). These authors consider the impact
of various stakeholders’ implicit claims, notably excluding managerial career concerns, on accounting method
choices (i.e., not accruals or real activities management perse). We discuss this related study in Section 2.
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destroying effects of real activities earnings management. The model consists of three distinct
periods, when the manager is young (or early career stage), mature, and retired from the ex-
ecutive suite but available for board service.4 As a consequence of, alternatively, the reversing
nature of accruals and the value destruction caused by real activities earnings management,
our model leads to the surprising prediction (i.e., relative to Holmstrom (1982, 1999) and
other career concerns models) that, in the absence of explicit compensation contracts, man-
agers who maximize lifetime compensation in a perfectly competitive labor market would have
little incentive to engage in income-increasing earnings management during the early stages
of their careers and would face significant pressure to manage earnings upward in the mature
period. The intuition for this result is that the executive receives only a fraction of the benefit
of the managed earnings in the early stage of her career because some portion of the superior
performance is attributed to noise or luck, whereas she is punished fully in the later years when
the accruals reverse or the real activities manifest in value destruction. By contrast, at least
some portion of the discretionary accruals (real activities choices) of the older executive will
reverse (manifest in value destruction) after she has retired, and hence the benefits of earnings
management exceed the costs for mature executives up to a certain optimal level. The model
generates a “signal jamming” equilibrium (Stein (1989)) with efficient markets and inefficient
managers; older executives engage in income-increasing earnings management in order to in-
fluence post-retirement (i.e., board service) labor market value. Although the labour market
correctly foresees this opportunistic behavior and does not over-compensate managers in the
post-retirement period, managers are nevertheless “trapped” into managing earnings in this
way since any failure to do so will be punished by the market.
Using data from ExecuComp, we empirically test our theoretical model’s prediction that
early stage managers will engage in less income-increasing earnings manipulation than their
older counterparts. With respect to accruals earnings management, we document that younger
CEOs undertake less income-increasing accruals, by about 1% of total assets, than older CEOs.
4Throughout the text, we treat age and career stage as synonymous. Thus, we use the terms “mature,”
“older” and “more established,” and respectively, “younger” and “earlier career stage,” interchangeably. We
draw a distinction between CEO age and tenure, however, which we investigate these as separate empirical
measures as well.
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Also consistent with hypotheses, we find that younger managers undertake less income increas-
ing real activities. Specifically, younger managers undertake less abnormal production costs,
at the rate of about 1.7% of total assets, on average, and they incur greater abnormal dis-
cretionary expenses of about 2% of total assets, all relative to their older peers. Our results
are robust across numerous specification checks, including the use of alternative age-based
proxies for career stage, controlling for all other known determinants of discretionary accruals
including numerous alternative proxies for explicit compensation- and stock-ownership-based
wealth incentives, to alternatively dropping older executives and first-year executives from our
sample, and to controlling for the effect of time-invariant firm and CEO characteristics that
may be correlated with CEO age.
We extend our empirical analyses by investigating the behavior of younger executives who
are faced with substantial incentives to manage earnings. For a sub-sample of firms that are
close to missing analyst estimates, we find that younger managers seem to choose the “lesser
of two evils” by managing accruals rather than undertaking real, potentially value-destroying
actions to meet the earnings threshold. Specifically, we find that younger CEOs do not exhibit
different propensities than their older counterparts with respect to accruals management when
their firms are close to missing an earnings benchmark. By contrast, the younger executives
do engage in less real activities management of about 3% to 4% of total assets, on average,
relative to older CEOs who are within similar proximity to missing analyst expectations.
Our study contributes to both the career concerns and earnings management literatures.
Recent studies in the career concerns area have documented that younger CEOs are more likely
to undertake acquisitions (Matta and Beamish (2008); Yim (2010)) and that they are more
likely to provide earnings forecasts (Dai et al (2009)). We document that CEO age affects
another important aspect of corporate behaviour, the intensively debated and extensively
studied accounting phenomenon of real and accruals based earnings management. We also
contribute to the earnings management literature by providing both theoretical and empirical
archival support for the survey-based results reported by Graham et al (2005) that career
concerns are an important implicit incentive in driving earnings management choices. We show
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that younger executives have stronger disincentives to engage in income-increasing accruals-
based and real activities earnings management relative to their more established counterparts.
Consistent with the earlier survey findings, our archival empirical results show that these
implicit career based incentives are an important determinant of earnings management, over
and above the explicit bonus- and equity-based incentives that have been the focus of the prior
empirical accounting literature. Our findings of differential earnings management for young
versus established CEOs are robust across many specifications, and they are economically
significant for both real and accruals earnings management choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature,
develops a theoretical model, and generates our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample
selection and data. Section 4 presents the empirical tests and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review, Model Development, and Hypotheses
2.1 Career Concerns: Extant Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence
Career concerns arise whenever the labor market uses the manager’s current output to up-
date its beliefs about the manager’s ability, and then bases the manager’s future wages upon
these updated beliefs. Fama (1980) first discusses career concerns and proposes that explicit
incentive contracts are not necessary to motivate managers since a manager can be disciplined
through career concern based implicit incentives; better output links to better future man-
agerial pay, while poor performance lowers the future labor market value of the manager.
Holmstrom (1982, 1999) formally addresses the issue of implicit incentives in the early versus
late stages of a manager’s career. The Holmstrom (1982, 1999) model suggests that career
concerns are greater for younger versus older managers; in the absence of contracts, managers
work too hard in the early years of their careers (while the market is still assessing the man-
ager’s type) in order to influence the market’s beliefs about their ability, and not hard enough
in later years. Although in equilibrium the market is not fooled regarding the manager’s type,
the manager is nevertheless compelled to exert more effort in the early years of her career in
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order to avoid being negatively assessed.5
An extensive empirical literature examines various career concern predictions following
from Holmstrom’s career concerns model. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) doc-
ument that older CEOs’ cash compensation is more sensitive to their firms’ stock market
performance, consistent with older executives being more motivated by explicit rather than
implicit incentives in the years preceding retirement. Elsaid et al (2008) find that abnor-
mal returns to CEO succession announcements are negatively related to the percentage of
performance-based pay awarded to the newly hired (and presumed earlier career stage) CEOs,
consistent with the notion that it is more efficient for earlier career stage CEOs to be paid in
human capital increases from the managerial labor market rather than to have their current
pay tied closely to performance. Brickley et al (1999) document that implicit performance
incentives remain present even during the later years of executives’ careers, as evidenced by
pre-retirement accounting and stock market performance being important determinants of
whether executives serve on their own or other boards after retirement. Matta and Beamish
(2008) as well as Yim (2010) show that career concerns lead younger CEOs to undertake fewer
corporate acquisitions, whereas Dai et al (2009) find that implicit incentives drive younger
CEOs toward higher propensities for issuing earnings forecasts. Applying the career concerns
model in a non-executive context, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) document that younger mutual
fund managers face different implicit incentives relative to older managers since they are more
likely to be fired for poor performance and for taking bold actions. Hong et al (2000) similarly
document that, because of career concerns, younger stock analysts are much more likely to
herd in their earnings forecasts.
More tightly linked to our setting, and a motivating factor for our study, is the descriptive
evidence on career concern motivations for earnings management presented by Graham et al
(2005). The authors survey more than 400 CFOs and document that over three quarters of
the respondents report that upward mobility in the labor market matters more than short-run
compensation in driving the desire to hit earnings benchmarks. Graham et al (2005) provide
5This notion of efficient markets with inefficient managers is known as a “signal jamming” equilibrium (see,
e.g., Stein (1989)).
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evidence of an important disconnect in the earnings management literature in relation to ex-
ecutive compensation incentives for earnings management; while the survey evidence strongly
suggests that implicit career concern incentives play the most important role in motivating
earnings management, the existing earnings management literature typically links earnings
management to explicit incentives such as contemporaneous cash bonuses and equity holdings.
One exception that we are aware of is a study by Bowen et al (1995) related to firm
stakeholders’ implicit claims on the firm’s accounting method choice. The authors empirically
document that proxies for the extent to which a firm depends upon the implicit claims of its
customers, suppliers, employees, and short-term creditors are significant in explaining cross-
sectional variation in inventory and depreciation methods. Bowen et al (1995) thus provide
initial evidence of the potential importance of implicit claims on the firm’s reported earnings.
Notably, however the authors do not specifically examine either CEO career concerns as an
implicit motivation for earnings management nor do they examine the impact of implicit claims
on discretionary accruals or real activity choices, which are the focus of the current study.
2.2 A Model of Earnings Management Based Upon Career Concerns
2.2.1 Model Setup and Assumptions
We develop a model of earnings management based upon managerial career concerns by build-
ing on the seminal work of Holmstrom (1982, 1999). To illustrate the effects of career concerns
we adopt the simplest possible three-period setting, in which the manager is young, established,
and retired. In periods 1 and 2, the executive is responsible for managing the firm, while in
period 3 the manager may serve as a board member during retirement. The labor market
is assumed to be competitive, and the manager is paid, at the beginning of each period, the
expected output that she will deliver in the current period given her history of outputs.6
Let η denote the manager’s unobservable productivity. For simplicity, assume that η
6As in other career concerns models, we do not consider optimal dynamic contracting, a significantly more
difficult problem.
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remains constant over time, with the following prior distribution
η ∼ N (m0, 1/h0) (1)
where h0 is the precision of the prior, the inverse of its variance.
Let xt denote the reported output in period t (i.e., x1 and x2 are the earnings reported
by the manager when she is young and established respectively, while x3 is the value added
from the manager’s post-retirement board service). During periods t = 1, 2 the manager may
manipulate accruals or engage in real activities to manage earnings. The period 1 reported
earnings are therefore given by
x1 = η + α1 + 1, (2)
where α1 is the earnings management through accruals manipulation or real activities in period
1. 1 is the shock, which is uncorrelated with the manager’s productivity η. Shocks in each
period are assumed to be normally distributed with precision h, such that
t ∼ N (0, 1/h). (3)
We assume that η, 1, 2 and 3 are jointly independent.
In period 1, when the manager is young, it is apparent that she can “impress” the labor
market in the short term by boosting earnings via accruals manipulation or real activity
choices. However, the amount of accruals manipulation in period 1 must be fully reversed
in period 2.7 Moreover, since real activity earnings management involves a deviation of real
activities from the optimal level, which is to say that these activities are value-destroying, real
activity alterations in period 1 are penalized at a multiple rate in period 2.8 In other words, we
7This assumption states that earnings cannot be indefinitely managed upward via accruals without triggering
a forced earnings restatement or fraud investigation, both of which are assumed to be associated with extreme
penalties to the manager. In other words, the manager needs to balance the books via accruals reversals
“eventually.” Since the manager only works for two periods in our model, full reversal in period 2 of the period
1 earnings manipulation is the natural assumption.
8In contrast to accrual earnings management, which occurs when management manipulates reported earnings
by exploiting the discretion allowed under GAAP to intertemporally shift earnings, real activities management
involves managers taking actions to adjust the timing and/or scale of the firm’s underlying business activities.
Thus, a key distinction between accruals-based and real activities earnings management is that the latter
7
assume that accruals reversal is dollar-for-dollar while the real activity earnings management
reversal is more than dollar-for-dollar.
In period 2, when the manager is at the established stage of her career, the period 1
earnings manipulations (accruals or real activities) are reversed and the manager has the
option to engage in a second round of earnings manipulations. Let α2 denote the amount of
“new” earnings manipulation in period 2. Reported output in period 2 is given by
x2 = η + α2 − λα1 + 2, (4)
where λ = 1 if the channel of earnings management is accruals based, and λ > 1 if earnings
management is accomplished via real activities.
The second period’s earnings manipulations also reverse in the subsequent period, after
the manager is retired. Because the period 2 manipulations will reverse only when the firm
is under new management, however, the retired manager will bear no “direct” consequences
from her period 2 earnings manipulation. When inferring the manager’s productivity (i.e.,
her type), the market will not incorporate the third period earnings reversal. Therefore, the
only mitigating force for our manager not to engage in excess manipulation in period 2 is
the convex cost of manipulating earnings.9 Let c(α) denote the cost associated with earnings
manipulation, with the standard properties of c′(α) > 0, c′′(α) > 0, and c′(0) = 0.
Lastly, the retirement period 3 output, x3, is given by
x3 = η + 3, (5)
Let wt denote the executive’s wage in period t, paid at the beginning of the period . Under
the assumption of competitive labor markets and no explicit performance-based pay, we have
w1 = E(x1|prior), (6)
destroys corporate value whereas the former simply shifts earnings across periods.
9Liang (2004) discusses these costs at greater length.
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w2(x1) = E(x2|x1), (7)
w3(x1, x2) = E(x3|x1, x2). (8)
2.2.2 Optimal Earnings Management
The executive’s objective is to maximize her utility function, which is represented as the
discounted present value of her lifetime compensation, net of the cost of earnings management:
U = E
[
w1 − c(α1) + β(w2 − c(α2)) + β2w3
]
, (9)
where 0 < β < 1 is the executive’s subjective discount rate.
Substituting (5) into (8) yields:
w3(x1, x2) = E(η|x1, x2) (10)
Let α1 and α2 denote the labor market’s conjectures of α1 and α2, respectively. z1 and z2
represent the market’s conjectures of unmanaged earnings, defined as:
z1 ≡ x1 − α1 = η + 1 (11)
z2 ≡ x2 − α2 + λα1 = η + 2. (12)
We apply the standard belief updating formula to obtain the conditional distribution of η
given z1 and z2 as follows:10









Thus, the market begins with prior m0, and adjusts its beliefs about η based upon the
information conveyed by z1 and z2. Similar to Holmstrom (1982, 1999), the market correctly
anticipates the level of earnings management in equilibrium. Therefore, z1 and z2 are known
10See, e.g., Greene (1997) Theorem 3.6 on marginal and conditional normal distributions.
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in equilibrium given the observed outputs in periods 1 and 2, x1 and x2, respectively.
The wages are given by:
w3(x1, x2) = E(η|x1, x2) = m0 + h
h0 + 2h
(x1 + x2 − α2 + (λ− 1)α1 − 2m0) (14)
w2(x1) = E(η|x1)11 + α∗212 − λα1 =
h0m0 + h(x1 − α1)
h0 + h
+ α∗2 − λα1 (15)
w1 = E(x1|prior) = E(η|prior) + α1 = m0 + α∗1. (16)
Backward induction in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium immediately implies the following
first order conditions for period 2, where we choose α2 to maximize (9) using (14):
∂U
∂α2
= −βc′(α2) + β2 h
h0 + 2h
= 0 (17)





The first order derivative with respect to α1 is:
∂U
∂α1










Since this derivative is negative, we end up with the corner solution α∗1 = 0 which im-
mediately implies that w∗1 = m0. We therefore have the result that the manager engages in
zero manipulation (accruals or real activities) in period 1 when she is young (i.e., α∗1 = 0),
but that she does engage in income-increasing earnings manipulation in period 2 when she is
established (i.e., α∗2 > 0).
11We obtain E(η|x1) by once again using the standard belief updating formula.
12Here we use the fact that both the market and the manager are able to figure out the optimal α∗2 by solving
the backward induction problem in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as specified in (17) and (18).
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2.2.3 Discussion of the Model
A number of key observations from our model merit being pointed out. The first two issues
derive from assumptions that are fundamental to career concerns models in general rather than
being specific to our particular earnings management setting. First, career concerns models
assume that both the market and the manager are equally informed about managerial ability
in all periods. All participants learn about the manager’s type in the same way, and there is no
information asymmetry. In other words, these are not adverse selection models. The manager
does try to influence the market’s inference about her type, and consequently a moral hazard
issue will arise. In equilibrium, however, no one is fooled.
Second, recall that the wages paid to the executive are assumed to be determined at
the beginning of each period based upon expected output. As a consequence of this feature,
the model effectively assumes away the role of explicit compensation contracts, where the
latter entail compensation being paid at the end of the period based upon realized output.
Accordingly, all of the model’s predictions derive solely from implicit incentives and implicit
contracts. This point is fundamental to our study, and should clarify the notion that career
concerns models are fundamentally different from a manager’s horizon problem. As the most
authoritative studies on the subject make clear, the “horizon problem” is inextricably linked to
explicit contracts and incentives.13 By contrast, such explicit incentives are totally absent from
our model; the incentives in our model are entirely implicit. Alternatively stated, a manager
with a horizons problem is apt to state that he “could care less about the future” (because he
will have left the firm and the labor force), whereas a manager with career concerns has the
opposite mentality; he cares very much about the future and his career prospects.
13For example, Smith and Watts (1982, p. 146) first describe the horizon problem in relation to bonus
compensation as follows, “Bonus plans can affect the real investment and financing decisions of the firm. For
example, because they are typically tied to annual profits, bonus plans give managers incentives to turn down
positive NPV projects with long pay back and to take negative value projects that impose expenses only
after the manager retires.” Similarly, Dechow and Sloan (1991) empirically investigate the horizon problem by
testing the hypothesis that earnings-based performance measures provide executives with incentives to focus
on short-term performance. In terms of its academic study, the “horizon problem” also tends to be linked to
opportunistic behavior in altering optimal real activity (such as cutting R&D), rather than being associated
with accruals manipulation. One exception is the recent study of Kalyta (2009), who finds evidence consistent
with his hypothesis that CEOs whose pensions are based upon pre-retirement firm performance are more likely
to manage earnings upwards using discretionary accruals.
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The final commentary to be made on our model relates to the economic intuition behind
its predictions, which are particular to our setting. Specifically, the predictions of our career
concerns model are being driven alternatively by the closed-ended, reversing nature of the
accrual accounting system and the value-destroying effects of real earnings management. The
intuition is that, for each dollar of earnings management in the first period, the impact on
the executive’s second period wage is hh0+h , which is less than one dollar. In other words,
there is a “leakage” that the executive does not capture as a result of the noise in the system
such that younger managers only receive a fraction of the benefit of the first period’s managed
earnings in their second period wage because some of the earnings-management-induced above-
expectations performance is attributed to noise or luck. By contrast, the manager’s second
period wage is penalized at least dollar-for-dollar of the amount of earnings management (i.e.,
λ ≥ 1). Furthermore, in the case of real earnings management, any period 1 manipulation
will have a negative impact on w3 via lower (x1 + x2).14 Finally, with reference to equation
(19), and driven by the assumption in our model that accruals manipulations are value-neutral
(λ = 1) while real activities management are value-destroying (λ > 1), we observe that the
disutility associated with one unit of accruals earnings management is lower than the disutility
stemming from one unit of real activities earnings management. This observation suggests that,
everything else being equal, accruals manipulation is the “lesser of two evils” for a younger
executive.
In summary, the manager’s utility is maximized by taking zero income-increasing accruals
or real activities earnings management choices when she is young and some positive amount
of income-increasing earnings management when she is established. There is greater disutility
associated with real activities earnings management relative to accruals manipulations. The
mature executive’s earnings management activities do not reverse during her tenure and the
market fully expects the older executive to choose the optimal level of earnings management
(i.e., subject to a cost-benefit analysis) so as to influence her post-retirement board service
compensation. Consistent with other career concerns models, in equilibrium the market is not
fooled about the manager’s choice of earnings management. Rather, the market correctly con-
14This result is evident from the third term in equation (19), which is negative for λ > 1 but zero for λ = 1.
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jectures the amount of earnings management in period 2 and appropriately adjusts downward
the third period wage such that the executive is not overpaid. The manager is nevertheless
trapped into introducing income-increasing earnings management in the second period since
any failure to do so will drive the market valuation against her. This equilibrium deviates
from the first-best solution in a manner similar to Stein (1989).15
2.3 Career Concerns and Earnings Management Empirical Hypotheses
2.3.1 Career Concerns and Discretionary Accruals
The theoretical model developed in the previous section involves an executive who is either
young or established during her active (i.e., pre-retirement) career, and accruals that reverse
entirely in the period subsequent to when they were initially taken. Although this is clearly a
simplified representation of the executive setting, the model’s empirical prediction is robust to
relaxing the condition related to the accruals reversals. The key assumption is that accruals
manipulations undertaken in the earlier career stage are more likely to reverse during the
executive’s tenure than the accruals that she manages at the later stages of her career.16
Following the model’s predictions, but recognizing that the practical world involves additional
incentives that are not explicitly specified in our necessarily simplified formal representation,17
we test the following empirical hypothesis:
H1: Ceteris paribus, younger managers use less income-increasing discre-
tionary accruals than their older counterparts.
15In a related context, but addressing a different research question and using a different model set-up, Stein
(1989) demonstrates that a manager concerned about “short-run” stock prices will behave myopically in order
to boost current earnings so as to mislead the market. In equilibrium, the market is not fooled by this signal
jamming but managers are nevertheless “trapped” into behaving myopically, similar to the Nash equilibrium in
the classical prisoner’s dilemma game.
16Consistent with this, Bhoraj et al (2009) document that firms that manage earnings to meet or beat analyst
forecasts exhibit short-run price benefits but then tend to underperform over longer horizons. They further
provide evidence that managers seem to understand the myopic nature of their actions, consistent with the
implicit understanding that we endow to the managers in our setting.
17For example, explicit bonus contracts and/or capital markets consequences of reporting earnings that fall
below expectations may motivate managers to do some accrual earnings management even in the earlier stages
of their careers. Accordingly, our empirical prediction is that younger managers will use less, but not necessarily
zero, income-increasing discretionary accruals, on average.
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2.3.2 Career Concerns and Real Activities Earnings Management
Most of the early empirical research related to real activities management considers the op-
portunistic reduction of R&D spending in order to achieve earnings targets (e.g., Baber et
al (1991), Dechow and Sloan (1991), Bushee (1998), and Bens et al (2002)).18 Other empir-
ical studies related to real operational activities management investigate firms’ opportunistic
propensities to dip into LIFO layers (Dhaliwal et al (1994)), cut sales prices (Jackson and
Wilcox (2000)), or sell long-term assets and marketable securities (Bartov (1993), Black et
al (1998), Hermann et al (2003), and Gunny (2005)) to meet earnings benchmarks.19 Roy-
chowdhury (2006) extends this literature by focusing on three significant operational activities
through which earnings can be managed, including: 1) acceleration of sales through limited
time price discounts or more favorable credit terms (e.g., zero-interest financing); 2) excessive
production to reduce cost of goods sold by inventorying part of the overhead; and 3) decreases
of discretionary expenses.20
Our hypothesis related to real activities management derives from the theoretical model
combined with a similar logic to that used above in the case of accruals, and is stated as
follows:
H2: Ceteris paribus, younger managers use less real activity earnings man-
agement than their older counterparts.
In their study of real earnings management in the context of career horizon concerns,
Dechow and Sloan (1991) document that CEOs reduce discretionary expenditures, such as
R&D and advertising, in their last years in office in order to boost earnings and maximize cash
18In a related theoretical study, Baber (1985) models the relation between managerial discretionary spending
and explicit budget-based compensation. He shows that if a lump-sum bonus is paid for meeting budgets,
then managers prefer more discretionary expenditures when budgets are tight. Baber (1985) does not con-
sider implicit career stage incentives, but rather models the explicit bonus-based compensation incentives over
discretionary expenses that are expected to yield an uncertain future payoff.
19See Xu et al (2007) for an extensive review of the real earnings management literature.
20Real financing activities have also been documented to be a means used to achieve earnings-related reporting
objectives. Such financing-type transactions include debt-equity swaps (Hand (1989)) and in-substance defea-
sance transactions (Hand et al (1990)), debt structurings (Marquardt and Weidman (2005)), share buybacks
(Bens et al (2003), Hribar et al (2006)), and stock-for-stock mergers that enable firms to use the earnings-
advantageous pooling of interests method (Ayers et al (2002)). Large financing transactions are often only
undertaken with the approval of the board of directors and hence are not investigated in the context of our
CEO career stage hypotheses.
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bonuses. While their results are consistent with our H2, their hypothesized reason for this
finding is quite different. While Dechow and Sloan (1991) conjecture that the documented cuts
in discretionary expenditures derive from the explicit incentives of compensation contracts, we
investigate whether real activities management is undertaken in response to implicit incentives.
Our empirical tests, discussed further below, are designed to identify the incremental effects of
implicit incentives due to age (our empirical proxy for career stage) over the explicit incentives
of pay-for-performance compensation documented to be relevant for earnings management by
Dechow and Sloan (1991) and other prior studies.
2.4 Early Career Stage Earnings Management Trade-Offs
It has been well documented that there are strong capital markets pressures for managers
to meet earnings benchmarks, particularly in the U.S. (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); De-
george, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999); Skinner and Sloan (2002); amongst many others) and
that the capital markets reward firms for meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts (Bartov, Givoly,
and Hayn (2002); Kasnik and McNichols (2002); among others). Accordingly, even though
our model suggests that early career stage managers should generally be reluctant to man-
age earnings upwards, we nevertheless expect that even younger executives will be driven to
manage earnings under extreme circumstances, such as when their firm is close to missing
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts.21 Thus we investigate younger managers’ propensities
to manage accruals and real activities, respectively, relative to their older counterparts in such
high earnings pressure situations.22 Following from our model, which posits that the disutility
from real activities earnings management exceeds that from intertemporal income shifting via
21Reporting a loss or earnings that are less than the prior year’s same quarter earnings per share are also
considered to be important earnings benchmarks that may induce earnings management, however the evidence
suggests that meeting (or beating) analysts’ estimates is the single most compelling earnings target (Brown
and Caylor (2005)) and accordingly we focus on this benchmark in our primary career concerns based earnings
management tests.
22Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggest that the discontinuity in analyst forecast errors around zero does not
provide ipso facto evidence of earnings management. If one were to believe their interpretation of the data,
then this would imply that some of the firms that we and prior researchers consider to be earnings management
“suspects” may not actually have greater propensities to manage earnings. Similarly, Payne and Thomas (2003)
claim that ex post I/B/E/S adjustments for stock splits may lead some firms to appear as having just beat
analyst estimates, whereas at the time of reporting the forecast error was greater than a penny. Any such
misclassifications of firms that were not more likely to have managed earnings into our “suspects” sample works
against our finding evidence of differential behavior within the suspected set of firms.
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accruals manipulation, ceteris paribus, we hypothesize the following:
H3A: When their firm is close to missing an earnings target, younger man-
agers, like their more established peers, feel pressured to manage accruals in order
to meet the analysts’ benchmark.
H3B: When their firm is close to missing an earnings target, younger man-
agers are less likely than their more established peers to undertake real earnings
activities in order to meet the analysts’ benchmark.
Taken together, evidence in support of both Hypotheses 3A and 3B is consistent with the
notion that younger managers choose the “lesser of two evils” (i.e., accruals over real activities
management) when pressured by the capital and/or labor markets to manage earnings to meet
analyst benchmarks.
3 Sample Selection and Data Description
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection Process
All of the data used in our study are derived from public sources. We obtain financial statement
data from Compustat and stock market metrics from the CRSP database. For a subset of our
tests, we rely upon analyst forecast estimates derived from I/B/E/S. Data related to executives’
compensation, age, tenure with their firm, and stock and option holdings are derived from the
ExecuComp database.
We restrict our sample to CEOs rather than other, lower level executives (e.g., CFOs)
for several reasons. First, although the CFO is presumably actively involved in the firm’s ac-
counting and financial reporting process (and thus in the determination of abnormal accruals),
the CEO has the ultimate authority over the firm’s management (including, e.g., decisions re-
garding real activities) as well as its financial reporting. Second, focusing on any other single
executive position such as the CFO substantially reduces the sample size due to the more
restricted ExecuComp coverage of non-CEO executives’ income, ownership, and age data. Fi-
nally, focusing on CEOs enables us to relate our findings to an extensive prior literature related
to these executives.
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The sample selection is summarized in Table 1. We begin our sample selection with the
intersection of the ExecuComp database with the Compustat annual industrial and research
files for the period of 1992 (the inception of ExecuComp data) through 2006. We exclude
financial firms and REITs (SIC codes 6000-6999) and all firm-year observations for which
sales or total assets are negative. In order to be included in the sample, we require each firm-
year observation to have at least eight Compustat observations available from the same 2-digit
SIC industry-year so that we can estimate the earnings accrual and real activities management
models described below. Excluding observations missing data required to estimate the modified
Jones accrual model and/or the abnormal expense models (discussed below) leaves 18,247 firm-
year observations (2,148 unique firms, 4,196 unique CEOs) for our primary sample.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample firms used in our primary
hypotheses tests. Detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Unt-
abulated results reveal that our sample contains firms that are, on average, larger (in terms of
sales, market capitalization, and total assets), than the mean firm from the CRSP-Compustat
universe. In this respect, our study suffers the same large firm bias that is known to affect
all research that is subject to the ExecuComp data availability constraint. Relative to the
non-financial firm CRSP-Compustat universe, sample firms are significantly more leveraged,
but have approximately the same book-to-market ratios. Virtually all are audited by one of
the Big-5 auditors. Mean and median CEO age is 56 years; their bonuses account for approx-
imately 22% of compensation, on average, and option and stock holdings represent a small
fraction of the shares outstanding. Implicit claim, NOAt−1, Litigation, and the SOX dummy
variable, all of which are defined in detail in the Appendix, are factors that prior studies have
documented to be associated with earnings management behavior. We therefore include these
variables as controls in our multivariate tests.
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3.2.1 Capturing Career Stage
We view the CEO’s age as best capturing his career stage, and thus our first empirical proxy
for career stage is simply the CEO’s age, measured as a continuous variable. We also consider
that there may be a non-linear relation between earnings management and career stage, and
thus we develop a second age-based proxy for career stage using an indicator variable, young,
that is set equal to one for CEOs whose age is less than 56, the median age for the sample,
and zero otherwise.
An alternative perspective is to examine the CEO’s tenure with the firm in the context
of career stage. Although we recognize the potential importance of CEO tenure on executive
decisions (e.g., Dikoli et al (2009)), in our view this measure captures less well the underlying
constuct of interest in our study.23 In untabulated results we nevertheless separately include
a variable capturing the CEO’s tenure in the top post, measured as the difference between
the observation year and the year that the CEO became the CEO of his/her current firm.
With the inclusion of the tenure variable, the coefficients on our age and young indicator test
variables of interest retain their signs, magnitudes, and significance levels across all of the
regression permutations discussed below. By contrast, the tenure variable is only significant
in one of the abnormal discretionary expense regressions.
3.3 The Estimation of Discretionary Accruals
We use the entire Compustat universe to estimate discretionary accruals for each of our firm-
year observations. For each 2-digit SIC industry-year with at least 8 observations, we model
total accruals using the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow et al (1995)) as follows:
TAj,t = α1(1/Aj,t−1) + α2(∆REVj,t −∆RECj,t) + α3PPEj,t + j,t (20)
23For example, an otherwise “young” CEO of, say, 50 years of age with 10 years of tenure in the top post
nevertheless has, in expectation, many years left in her career. Accordingly, we would expect this CEO to take
less income-increasing accruals or real decisions because, in expectation, these will reverse before she retires. By
contrast, a 63-year-old CEO with 3 years of tenure with his firm is expected to engage in more income-increasing
earnings management activities because it is more likely that he will be retired by the time the repercussions
of his actions are recognized by the firm (i.e., in the form of accruals reversals or value destruction).
18
where TAj,t = EBXj,t − CFOj,t, with EBX being earnings before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations (Compustat data123) and CFO being the operating cash flow from
continuing operations (Compustat data308 minus data124). Aj,t−1 is the prior period’s total
assets (Compustat data6), and each of TAj,t (total accruals), ∆REVj,t (change in sales, Com-
pustat data12), ∆RECj,t (change in net receivables, Compustat data2) and PPEj,t (gross
PP&E, Compustat data7) are all scaled by this lagged total assets measure.
Estimation of equation (20) produces industry-year specific coefficients that in turn yield
fitted values and residuals for each firm-year observation included in our sample. Following the
extensive prior literature, we interpret the fitted values from these regressions to be normal
accruals and the residuals to be the discretionary accruals metrics that will be used in the
formal hypothesis tests. As reported in Table 2B, these procedures yield mean (median)
discretionary accruals of 0.016 (0.001), and there is a considerable amount of cross-sectional
variation in this variable. Estimated discretionary accruals for the firms in our sample are
broadly comparable to those of prior studies such as Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Cohen,
Dey and Lys (2008) who use the same methodology.
3.3.1 Alternative Measures of Discretionary Accruals
Although our primary tabled results discussed below use the same measure of discretionary
accruals as adopted by Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Cohen et al (2008), we nevertheless run
several robustness checks using alternative estimates of discretionary accruals. First, we use
the modified Jones model applied to the Fama-French (1997) industry classifications instead
of those based upon 2-digit SIC codes. Second, we use the performance-matching technique
proposed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). In untabulated results, we find that all of the
hypothesis test results reported below are robust to either of these two alternative measures
of discretionary accruals, and often the results are slightly stronger.24
24Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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3.4 The Estimation of Real Activities Management
Roychowdhury (2006) uses three empirical measures to detect real activities manipulation,
including abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal
discretionary expenses. Given the primacy of earnings in CEO performance evaluation, com-
pensation, and retention decisions, we focus on the two real activities measures developed by
Roychowdhury (2006) that are most directly tied to earnings and that have unambiguous per-
formance measurement implications, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary
expenses. Price discounts, more favorable credit terms, and overproduction all induce ab-
normally high production costs relative to sales. Following from Hypothesis 2, we therefore
expect that abnormal production costs bear a positive association with managerial age. Cut-
ting discretionary expenses such as R&D and advertising leads to abnormally low discretionary
expenses, and therefore Hypothesis 2 leads us to expect that younger managers will be asso-
ciated with higher abnormal discretionary expenses.
Following the methodology developed by Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate the following
















where Prodj,t = COGS (Compustat data41) + ∆INV (Compustat data3), Salesj,t (Com-
pustat data12) is the current year’s sales, ∆Salesj,t is the current year’s change in sales,










where DisExpj,t is the sum of advertising expense (Compustat data45), R&D (Compustat
data46) and SG&A (Compustat data189), and the other variables are as previously defined.
The coefficients derived from industry-year estimations of (21) and (22) produce fitted val-
ues for each firm-year which correspond to normal production costs and normal discretionary
expenses, respectively, and the residuals from each of these two models provide measures
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of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, respectively. Summary
statistics for each of these measures are presented in Table 2B. As shown, the mean abnormal
production costs and average abnormal discretionary expenses are approximately 7% of total
assets, which are broadly comparable to the estimates reported by Cohen et al (2008).25
3.5 Estimation of Explicit Earnings Management Incentives
Although explicit incentives do not play a role in our theoretical model, multivariate empirical
tests of the career stage hypothesis must necessarily control for CEOs’ explicit earnings man-
agement incentives in order to avoid a possible correlated omitted variables bias. As no single
generally accepted empirical proxy for this construct exists, we estimate multiple specifica-
tions that include alternative “state-of-the-art” measures for the CEOs’ explicit wealth- and
compensation-based earnings management incentives. The general predictions from theory and
prior empirical literature are that higher levels of cash bonus (or performance-based-pay other-
wise determined) lead to higher levels of income-increasing earnings management as managers
have incentives to push the envelope in order to meet performance pay thresholds. By con-
trast, CEO stock and option ownership lead to longer-term managerial perspectives and thus
are predicted to be associated with lower levels of short-term-oriented earnings management.
Our first measure of an explicit compensation-based incentive for earnings management is
captured by the percentage of CEO pay derived from cash bonus compensation (see, Cheng
and Warfield (2005), amongst many other studies that have adopted a similar measure). As
a second alternative, we use the CEO’s compensation-earnings coefficient suggested by Bush-
man, Engel, and Smith (2006). We measure separately the CEO’s wealth-based incentives
using several alternative proxies. First, we include the CEOs’ percentage ownership of the
company via equity and option holdings, respectively (Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Co-
hen et al (2008)). Second, we use the composite wealth-based incentive measure proposed
by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) to capture in a single variable the combined stock- and
options-based CEO incentives over earnings. Estimations of the Bushman et al (2006) and
25Roychowdhury (2006) does not report descriptive statistics for his estimates of abnormal discretionary
expenses and production costs.
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Bergresser and Philippon (2006) measures are each described below.
3.5.1 Pay-Earnings Sensitivity Measure
We develop a measure of the CEO’s pay-earnings sensitivity by adopting the regression-based
compensation-earnings coefficient (“CEC”) metric suggested by Bushman, Engel and Smith
(2006, equation 3), which is as follows:
COMPt = α+ CEC ∗∆EARNt + CRC ∗RETt + εt (23)
where COMPt is the percentage change in the CEO’s cash compensation in year t ; ∆EARNt
is the change in earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations between year
t and year t − 1, deflated by the total assets at the beginning of year t; RETt is the firm’s
cumulative stock market return over the 12-month period of the firm’s fiscal year t ; CEC
is the compensation-earnings coefficient; and CRC is the compensation returns coefficient.
We estimate the regression represented by equation (23) on a firm-specific basis, and we
adopt the estimated CECs as a measure of the CEOs’ explicit earnings-based incentives over
earnings management activities, which we refer to as the pay-earnings sensitivity parameter.26
Descriptive statistics related to the estimated firm-specific pay-earnings sensitivity coefficients
to be used as control variables in our subsequent tests are provided in Table 2A. The mean
and median of our estimates are broadly similar, albeit somewhat larger, than those reported
26Although Bushman et al (2006) require 20 observations per firm in order to compute their CEC estimates,
they use compensation data gathered from the Forbes annual survey and thus have a much longer potential
time series to work with than that which is available to us from the ExecuComp database. We require only
3 years of data to obtain our CEC estimates. As Bushman et al (2006) recognize, the timeseries specification
imposes assumptions related to the stationarity of the relationship between pay and performance that are more
likely to be violated as the length of the timeseries is extended. Our research design choice maximizes the
number of observations available for the second stage test regressions of interest in our study and imposes
lighter stationarity assumptions on the CEC estimates, but at the potential expense of greater measurement
error being embedded in the CEC estimates. Because the pay-sensitivity estimates are merely control rather
than test variables in our second stage regressions of interest, and also given that we report specifications
using alternative proxies for the same construct, we are willing to accept this measurement error trade-off.
To eliminate the effects of any extreme outliers arising from this process, however, we winsorize the top and
bottom 1% of the CEC estimates. As a further specification check, we again follow Bushman et al (2006) and
alternatively measure the CEC at the two-digit industry level, requiring a minimum of 20 observations per
industry, and including year fixed effects in the regressions. All of the results from the second stage analyses
related to our age-based test variables of interest as reported below are robust to the inclusion of this alternative
industry-based pay-sensitivity measure.
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by Bushman et al (2006), the distribution of our estimates is wider, and we have a slightly
higher percentage of negative-valued estimates relative to the prior authors (i.e., 27% for our
sample as compared to their 20%).
3.5.2 Composite Equity-Based Incentives Measure
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide a composite measure of the CEOs’ equity-based
wealth incentives, calculated as the dollar change in the value of a CEO’s stock and options
holdings that correspond to a one percent increase in the company’s stock price, normalized
by the CEO’s total compensation. Specifically,
ONEPCTi,t = 0.01 ∗ PRICEi,t ∗ (SHARESi,t +OPTIONSi,t) (24)
and
IncentiveRatioi,t = ONEPCTi,t/(ONEPCTi,t + SALARYi,t +BONUSi,t). (25)
where SHARES is the number of shares owned by the CEO and OPTIONS is the number of
options held by the CEO. The IncentiveRatio variable thus captures the share of the CEO’s
total compensation coming from a one percentage point increase in the value of the equity of
her company. Descriptive statistics for the estimated IncentiveRatio variable are provided
in Table 2A and are broadly consistent with those reported by Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006).
3.6 Descriptive Evidence
Pairwise correlations between accruals and real activities earnings management variables, to-
gether with CEO age and the young indicator variable, executive ownership and other explicit
earnings management wealth- and compensation-based incentive variables, as well as other
factors known to influence earnings management that are to be included as control variables
in our multivariate regressions, are presented in Table 3. As shown, although CEO age and the
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young indicator variable are most often statistically significantly correlated with the explicit
earnings management incentive variables defined above, the pairwise correlations between age
and these contract-oriented incentives are not of economically interesting magnitudes.
In untabulated results we find that pairwise tests for differences between young and
established CEOs are significant across all three measures of accounting discretion. Specifi-
cally, younger CEOs are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals, lower levels of
abnormal production costs, and higher levels of abnormal discretionary expenses relative to
more established executives. This provides some preliminary support, on a univariate basis,
in favor of our first two hypotheses.
4 Hypotheses Testing
4.1 Model Specification
Our formal hypothesis tests are based upon multivariate regressions of the three alternative
measures of earnings management on our two alternative proxies for career stage as well as
explicit contracting-based and other earnings management incentives. Our tests attempt to
control for all of the variables that may be different across firms managed by younger versus
more established executives. The control variables that we consider are those suggested by
Cheng and Warfield (2005), and Cohen, et al (2008). Cheng and Warfield investigate the link
between equity incentives and accruals-channeled earnings management. Cohen, et al (2008)
examine how each of accruals and real activity earnings management varies from the pre-
to post-Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) period. They treat the Cheng and Warfield (2005) equity
interest variables as control variables in their regressions, as we do in our tests. Given the
results of Cohen, et al (2008), we also include an indicator variable for the post-SOX period
as a control variable in our regressions.
We estimate the following regression of earnings management activities on the control
variables suggested by the prior literature, controls for the CEO’s explicit earnings-based pay
24
and equity incentives, and each of our two alternative age-based proxies for career stage:
EM Proxyi,t = γ0 + βCareerStagei,t + γ1CompensationIncentivei,t (26)
+γ2EquityIncentivei,t + γ3Sizei,t + γ4Leveragei,t + γ5Riski,t + γ6Growthi,t
+γ7NOAi,t−1 + γ8Litigationi,t + γ9ImplicitClaimi,t + γ10Big5 Auditori,t
+γ11∆GDP + γ12Time+ γ13SOX + i,t
where EM Proxyi,t represents the dependent variable, DAi,t, Abnormal Prod Costsi,t, and
Abnormal Disc Expsi,t each in turn. CareerStagei,t is defined alternatively as either the
executive’s age or with a young indicator variable set equal to one if the executive’s age is less
than the median age of CEOs in our sample, and zero otherwise. CompensationIncentivei,t
is defined alternatively as either the percentage of the CEO’s total pay that is comprised
of cash bonus compensation (Bonus%) or the Bushman et al (2006) compensation-earnings
coefficient (pay-earnings sensitivity) previously described. Our empirical measures for the
equity incentive construct include the stand alone composite measure due to Bergstresser
and Philippon (2006), IncentiveRatioi,t, or alternatively the contemporaneous inclusion of
three separate measures capturing the percentage of the firm’s common equity represented by
the CEO’s stock holdings (Owner%), exercisable options (Ex Option%), and unexercisable
options (Un Option%), respectively. The proxies for Size, Risk and Growth are market
capitalization, beta, and book-to-market, respectively, and SOX is an indicator variable for
the Sarbanes-Oxley era that is set equal to one for fiscal periods ending after 2002.27 The
remaining control variables are those suggested by the prior literature, detailed definitions of
which are provided in the Appendix.28
27Although SOX and T ime are highly correlated, the variance inflation factors for the regressions reported
in our tables never exceed 3.61, well below the thresholds (varying from 5 to 10) that are commonly considered
to be indicative of a significant collinearity problem. Because SOX and T ime are designed to capture different
constructs, we follow Cohen et al and run all of our regressions with both variables included in the models.
28In untabulated results, we also separately include return-on-assets (ROA) and the number of restricted
shares held by the CEO as a percentage of the firm’s total shares outstanding. ROA is significant in some
models, but the restricted stock variable is never significant. In all cases our inferences regarding the influence
of CEO career stage on the earnings management variables of interest are unaffected.
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4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Career Concerns and Earnings Management Via Accruals
In Table 4 we present the results from regressions of equation (26) using discretionary accruals
as the dependent variable. We present regressions using each of our two alternative age-based
proxies for career stage, the test variable of interest, as well as each of two alternative controls
for compensation- and equity-based incentives, respectively. Thus we display eight regression
permutations. We use very conservative firm-CEO clustered standard errors to compute the
t-statistics reported for all regression results reported in the tables.
As shown in Table 4, both of the age variables are significant in each of the eight abnormal
accruals regression specifications. The positive coefficient on age, the continuous measure,
indicates that older CEOs are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals, consistent
with Hypothesis 1. The negative coefficient of slightly less than 1% on the age indicator
variable indicates that younger CEOs undertake, on average, about 1% of total assets less in
accruals earnings management than their more established counterparts. Given that the mean
and median range of ROA is about 6% for the entire sample, the difference in discretionary
accruals across the early and later career stage CEOs is economically meaningful.
In the first four regressions, the percentage of compensation earned in the form of cash
bonuses is positively and (at least weakly) significantly associated with accruals management,
consistent with a long prior literature dating back to Healy (1985). With Bonus% in the
regression, none of the stock or option ownership variables are significant. When we control
for earnings-based compensation incentives using the pay-earnings sensitivity coefficient, only
the unexpired options ownership variable is (weakly) significant. Notably, the magnitudes
and significance of the coefficents on the age variables of interest are stable across all of the
regression specifications. Overall, our findings suggest that career stage is a statistically and
economically significant determinant of CEOs’ propensities to manage accruals, even after
controlling for more direct CEO compensation and equity incentives as well as other known
determinants of earnings management. Our results are thus consistent with the hypothesis
generated from the career concerns based earnings management model, that more established
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executives tend to engage in higher levels of discretionary accruals.
4.2.2 Career Concerns and Real Activities Management
Table 5 presents the results of regressions of our real activities earnings management vari-
ables on the same career stage, compensation- and equity-based incentives, and other control
variables considered in the previous section. In Panel A the dependent variable is abnormal
production costs. Abnormal production costs arise because firms have overproduced relative
to the current period’s sales levels, with the result that some of the production costs incurred
this period will be inventoried. Thus, higher abnormal production costs are presumed to result
from a real activity that has been managed to increase the current period’s income. Hence,
under Hypothesis 2 we predict a positive association between CEO maturity and abnormal
production costs. The results in Table 5A are consistent with this; real earnings manage-
ment activities in the form of increased abnormal production costs are an increasing function
of executive maturity, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the age variable across all
specifications. We find similarly strong support for Hypothesis 2 when we use the alterna-
tive indicator variable for young executives as our proxy for career stage, as evidenced by
the significant negative coefficient in each of the specifications that includes the young indi-
cator variable. The coefficients ranging from -0.0157 to -0.0184 suggest that younger CEOs
take approximately 1.6% to 1.8% of total assets less in abnormal production costs, which are
economically significant magnitudes. Once again the magnitudes of the coefficients on the
age variables of interest are stable across the various alternative combinations of controls for
performance pay and ownership incentives, although the significance levels naturally decline
somewhat as our sample size is reduced for the estimations of Models 5 through 8.
Unlike in the abnormal accruals regressions, we find that Bonus% is insignificant when it is
included with the decomposed proxy for equity-based incentives, while each of the ownership
variables is significant with the predicted sign. Bonus% regains significance when equity-
based incentives are measured using the composite IncentiveRatio variable, and the composite
variable itself is also significant. The negative coefficients on the ownership and Incentiveratio
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variables are consistent with the notion that, conditional upon age and bonus pay being in
the model, higher levels of equity-based incentives lead executives to take more of a long-term
view with respect to the management of the firm’s real activities. When compensation-based
earnings management incentives are captured using the pay-earnings sensitivity measure as in
Models 5 through 8 in Table 5A, this incentive pay variable is significant and its coefficient takes
the expected sign across all specifications; higher pay-earnings sensitivity induces executives
to take more income-increasing abnormal production costs. All of the equity-based incentive
measures are also significant with the expected signs across each of the last four specifications.
The positive coefficient on SOX is also consistent with Cohen et al (2008) as well as Bartov
and Cohen (2009), who find that real earnings management activities increase in the post-SOX
period.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from regressions that use abnormal discretionary
expenses as the dependent variable. Discretionary spending on R&D or marketing, e.g., is ex-
pected to be reduced by more mature CEOs in order to increase short-term income and thereby
positively impact their post-retirement labor market value. Alternatively stated, younger ex-
ecutives are expected to incur higher levels of discretionary expenses as they continue to invest
in the firm’s intellectual capital (e.g., patents, process improvements, name brands, etc.) at the
optimal level so as to avoid any negative impact on their future wage due to the value destroy-
ing effects of such real earnings management. Hence, under Hypothesis 2 we predict a negative
relationship between CEO maturity and discretionary expenses. The findings reported in Ta-
ble 5B are consistent with this across all eight alternative specifications; the coefficient on age
is negative and significant whereas that on the young indicator variable is consistently positive
and significant. The coefficients on the young indicator variable range from 0.0196 to 0.0236,
suggesting that younger CEOs incur abnormal discretionary expenses of about 2% of assets
more than older CEOs, which is once again an economically significant magnitude.
In the abnormal discretionary expenses regressions, Bonus% is only marginally significant
when the decomposed equity-based incentives are included, but not in the presence of the
IncentiveRatio. In accordance with expectations, the pay-earnings sensitivity variable is neg-
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ative in each of the discretionary expense regression specifications, although not significantly
so in any case. Similarly, the composite IncentiveRatio variable is statistically significant and
carries the expected sign across all specifications, consistent with executives responding to this
comprehensive measure of equity-based incentives when making real discretionary expense de-
cisions. By contrast, the Owner% and unexercisable options variables are never significant,
while the exercisable options variable is significant with the expected sign in all four cases.
The evidence from Tables 5A and 5B provides strong support for Hypothesis 2 that younger
CEOs engage in less income-increasing real activities earnings management, and the results
hold across both of the dimensions of real activities examined. Our findings are economi-
cally and statistically significant, and they’re robust to using two different age-based proxies
for career stage, to controlling for two alternative state-of-the-art measures each for explicit
compensation-based incentives and equity-based incentives for earnings manipulation, as well
as to controlling for other candidate determinants of earnings management across firms.
4.2.3 Earnings Management Trade-Offs of Younger Executives
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5, when taken together, provide some preliminary
evidence in support of the notion that younger CEOs prefer to engage in accruals management
rather than to undertake real activities in order to increase earnings. In Table 4 we document
that younger CEOs’ abnormal accruals are slightly less than 1% of total assets lower than
those of older CEOs, whereas the results in Table 5 suggest that their income-increasing
discretionary real activities are lower by 1.6% to 2.4% of total assets. Thus, younger CEOs
seem to face relatively greater disincentives to engage in real activities versus accruals-based
earnings management relative to their older peers.
To address Hypothesis 3 even more directly, we investigate younger CEOs’ relative propen-
sities for income-increasing accruals versus real activities using a setting where the pressures
to undertake some form of earnings management would seem to be intense. Specifically, in
order to identify a subset of firms where these pressures are likely to be binding, we follow
Roychowdhury (2006) and develop a “suspects” sample of earnings management candidate
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firms which includes firm-year observations having analyst forecast errors in the range of zero
to one-cent per share.29 We use the median of all analysts’ final forecasts that were outstand-
ing prior to the earnings announcement date to define our analyst consensus forecast measure.
In untabulated specification checks, we find that using the mean final analyst forecast as the
consensus leads to consistent results for all of our career stage test variables of interest.
Table 6 reports the results from regressions using 2,716 firm-year observations that qualify
as “suspects” for analyst earnings target induced earnings management as defined above. The
results shown in the first two columns indicate that there is no significant difference in accruals
earnings management activities for younger versus older managers in cases where pressures for
meeting or beating analyst expectations are presumed to be intense. This finding contrasts
with the results presented above for the unconstrained general sample of firms, wherein we
find that younger managers undertake less discretionary accruals than older executives, on
average. For the case of real earnings management, however, the significant coefficients on
the age variables in the regressions reported in the last four columns of Table 6 indicate
that older managers undertake more real activities management than younger managers in
circumstances of suspected heightened earnings performance pressures. Although the results
for the continuous age variables may seem borderline significant, we remind the reader that
the t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors and that our tests involve a
directional hypothesis. Finally, in untabulated results we find that specifications using the
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) composite measure of equity incentives yield results for our
age variables that are entirely consistent with those reported in Table 6.
Overall, the evidence presented is supportive of Hypothesis 3 that under circumstances in
which younger executives are presumed to face intense pressures to manage earnings to meet
29We acknowledge the possibility that, similar to many prior researchers who have used the identical “sus-
pects” identification rule, we may have a somewhat noisy set of “suspect” firms. This ultimately works against
our finding differential behavior for this group relative to the unconstrained sample underlying our primary
tests. As further support for our research design choice, however, we note that Keung, Lin and Shih (2009)
provide evidence that is consistent with the notion that earnings that are just above analyst estimates are more
likely to have been managed. They show that the earnings response coefficients (“ERCs”) for earnings surprises
that are in the range of zero to one cent are significantly lower than for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges,
suggesting that the market considers these earnings to be of lower quality. The authors also conclude that
investors are right to be skeptical about earnings in the zero to one-cent range based upon the relation between
these earnings and future earnings, and they further show that analysts react negatively to earnings surprises
within this range.
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analyst forecasts, they tend to chose the “lesser of two evils” by managing accruals rather than
undertaking real activities that may involve longer-term value destruction.
4.3 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
4.3.1 Time-Invariant Firm and CEO Characteristics
One alternative explanation for our results is that firms that have greater income increasing
earnings management tendencies also happen to select older CEOs. This could happen, for
example, if firms that evince higher earnings management propensities choose older CEOs
either because they expect there to be an alignment between CEO age and his willingness
or ability to engage in earnings management, or simply because these firms tend to prefer
the (real or perceived) sense of stability that comes with older managers. Alternatively, high
earnings management propensity firms may not select CEOs on the basis of age, but on the
basis of some other characteristic that is correlated with age. The result in any of these cases
is that firms with greater earnings management propensities choose older CEOs, but CEO
age has no causal effect on earnings management activity. This explanation suggests that
better controls for firms’ earnings management propensities should make the effect of CEO
age disappear. We remind the reader that our earnings management dependent variables are
all estimated at the industry level, that our earnings management regressions control for all of
the previously documented determinants of earnings management, and furthermore that our
significant results for the age variables are robust to using performance-matched discretionary
accruals. Accordingly, we consider the evidence already presented to be strongly weighted
against any form of selection story.
Nevertheless, in Panel A of Table 7 we report a robustness check in which each of our
previous earnings management models is estimated with the inclusion of firm fixed effects
in order to control for all observed and unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics that
may be correlated with CEO age and income-increasing earnings management propensities.
Each of the regressions includes all of the previously considered control variables reported
in Tables 4 and 5, however for the sake of parsimony we do not table the control variable
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coefficients. As shown, our age variable remains significant across all regression specifications,
and in all cases the significance levels are higher than in the previously reported regressions.
The reason for the latter result is that the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 use extremely
conservative firm-CEO clustered standard errors. The results in Panel A of Table 7 suggest
that the documented relation between CEO age and earnings management behaviour is not
due to firms with greater income-increasing earnings management propensities selecting older
CEOs, assuming that earnings management propensity is a time-invariant firm characteristic.
An argument similar to the one raised above might suggest that the age results in our pre-
vious analyses are being driven by some time-invariant CEO characteristics which in turn are
correlated with age in the cross-section. For example, CEOs that are more savvy or creative
in business may exhibit lower earnings management propensities because “real” performance
success is attainable without earnings management, and these characteristics are also in turn
correlated with age because savvy and creative executives attain CEO status earlier. If earn-
ings management behavior is really driven by such characteristics that are fixed over the CEO’s
lifetime, then including CEO fixed effects should lead the age variables to have insignificant
coefficients. We therefore rerun our previous earnings management regressions with the in-
clusion of CEO fixed effects. In untabled results, we find that the coefficients on all of our
age variables behave similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 7; the age variables remain
significant, and the significance levels are higher on all of the coefficients.30
4.3.2 Horizon Problems
Prior research presents mixed evidence regarding the relation between earnings discretion and
CEO retirement. For example, Dechow and Sloan (1991) present evidence in support of the no-
tion that CEOs spend less on R&D during their final years in office due to the horizon problem,
30Yet another alternative approach to addressing concerns regarding CEO and firm selection is to use propen-
sity score matching. This method helps to overcome the possibility that the linear controls in the earnings
management regressions are inadequate, and that age is picking up the nonlinear effects of firm characteristics
on earnings management choices. We use propensity score matching to reweight observations in the young
versus old CEO samples and to thereby create ”ideal” comparison groups that have comparable covariate dis-
tributions and that differ only on age. Our preliminary results from these analyses indicate that younger CEOs
still do less income-increasing earnings management, supporting the notion that our age results are not driven
by distributional differences in observed covariates between firms with old versus young CEOs.
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while Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find little support for the impact of horizon on R&D
expenditures using a different specification. For his sample of firms, Kalyta (2009) documents
that income-increasing earnings management is present in the pre-retirement period only when
the CEO’s pension is based on firm performance. In contrast to the mixed empirical results
in relation to the horizon problem, our findings that income-increasing behaviour is increasing
in CEO age are robust across many specifications and alternative controls. Nevertheless, it’s
conceivable that our results could be explained by the horizon problem rather than the implicit
career concerns that we contend if, for example, the older CEOs in our sample who are nearing
retirement are primarily driving our empirical results. As a specification check, we therefore
drop from our sample all CEOs whose age is equal to, or above, 63, being those CEOs who
are close to normal retirement age. The results from this specification check are presented in
Panel B of Table 7. As shown, our age variable remains significant across all specifications
even for this reduced sample of observations.
We conclude from the combination of the mixed evidence in the prior horizon problem lit-
erature, together with the robustness of our own age results across all specifications, including
one in which the CEOs who are most likely to be subject to a horizon problem are dropped
from the sample, that implicit career concerns rather than horizon problems are the likely
explanation for the age-based findings that we document.
4.3.3 First-Year CEOs
Pourciau (1993) presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that incoming executives
manage accruals in a way that decreases earnings in the year of the executive change and
increases earnings in the following year. If first-year CEOs are systematically younger than
continuing CEOs, as is likely to be the case, then these first-year CEO earnings management
activities could be driving our cross-sectional results. In other words, it is not the CEO’s age,
but the fact that he is in his first year on the job with a new firm, that is causing discretionary
earnings to be lower. We consider this alternative explanation to be unlikely because a “young”
new CEO is likely to remain “young” in his second year on the job when the accruals have
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income-increasing effects. Thus, in our cross-sectional analyses any such first and second year
effects are likely to offset one another. Notwithstanding this argument, we verify that first-year
CEO observations are not driving our results by dropping all observations from our dataset
involving a CEO’s first year with a new firm, and then rerunning the previous regressions on
the reduced sample. Although the significance of our coefficient estimates declines somewhat
with the loss of observations, the magnitudes of the coefficients on our age variables are
robust and remain significant across all regressions. We therefore conclude once again that
career concerns, rather than rookie year CEO behavior in this case, is primarily driving the
significance of our age variables in the cross-section.
4.3.4 Other Explanations
Yet another alternative explanation for our findings is that, rather than being motivated by
career concerns as our model would suggest, younger CEOs are simply less savvy; they engage
in less earnings management because they are less aware of the opportunities and benefits
of doing so. Although we cannot empirically distinguish between this alternative and the
career concerns explanation that we propose for our results, we consider the alternative to be
unlikely. The descriptive statistics for the executives in our sample suggest that the CEOs have
a substantial number of years of experience, presumably in increasingly important managerial
positions before arriving to the top post. Thus, it seems to us unlikely that these talented
and successful executives who become CEOs of the largest 1500 publicly-traded US firms are
unaware of the earnings management “games” (see Levitt (1998)), and thus the potential
“benefits” to be derived therefrom, that have been the focus of considerable discussion and
debate in academic research, MBA classrooms, and the financial press throughout the period
of our study.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The recent survey evidence of Graham et al (2005) suggests that executives’ career prospects
are the most important determinant of corporate earnings management decisions, yet the
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extant academic literature has focused primarily on explicit contracting based explanations
for this phenomenon. The point of our paper is to investigate, using theoretical and archival
empirical methodologies, this apparent disconnect between executives’ self-reported incentives
for their earnings management choices versus those that have been the focus of the prior
academic literature.
We first develop a theoretical model of earnings management, rooted in the classic career
concerns framework of Holmstrom (1982, 1999), to motivate our empirical investigations. Our
model alternatively incorporates the reversing nature of the accruals that are embedded in an
earnings-based performance measurement system and the longer-term value destruction that
is associated with real activities earnings management. The model generates the prediction
that younger managers will have greater disincentives to undertake income-increasing accruals
and real activities choices than their older counterparts.
Our primary empirical results provide support for this hypothesis. In extended tests we
investigate the earnings management behavior of younger CEOs who are in circumstances
that are consistent with intense pressures to meet an earnings benchmark, and we find that
they seem to choose the “lesser of two evils” by managing accruals rather than undertaking
real activities that could potentially have longer-term value-destroying effects. We subject our
primary tests to a battery of robustness checks in order to discriminate between our career-
based hypotheses and alternative explanations for the significance of CEO age as a determinant
of earnings management choices. Our career-based conclusions are robust to alternatively
including firm or CEO fixed-effects, to alternatively dropping older CEOs or first-year CEOs
from our sample, and to numerous alternative controls for the explicit CEO compensation-
and wealth-based incentives that have been the focus of prior studies.
Overall, we present robust and consistent new evidence that CEO age is a statistically and
economically significant determinant of real activities and accruals-based earnings management
levels. After numerous robustness checks, we conclude that non-contractual, implicit career
stage incentives are important determinants of corporate earnings management behavior. Our
findings are consistent with executives’ own self-insights regarding their earnings management
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choices, but also suggest that CEO age may be a significant correlated omitted variable in





Total Assets: Compustat data6
Market cap: Market capitalization, calculated as the price per share (Compustat data199)
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (Compustat data25)
Sales: Compustat data12
Leverage: Long-term debt (Compustat data9) divided by total assets (Compustat data6)
Book-to-Market: Book value of equity (Compustat data60) divided by market capitalization
A.2 Dependent Variables:
DA: Discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model described in Section 3.3
Abnormal prod costs: Abnormal production costs as defined in Section 3.4
Abnormal disc expenses: Abnormal discretionary expenses as defined in Section 3.4
A.3 Independent Test Variables:
Age The CEO’s age during the year
Young indicator : 1 if the CEO’s age is less than the median, 0 otherwise
A.4 Compensation- and Wealth-based Incentive Variables:
Bonus%: Bonus compensation divided by total compensation
Pay-earnings sensitivity : A firm-specific estimate of the compensation-earnings coefficient
(“CEC”) as defined in Equation 23 in Section 3.5.1
Ex options%: Unexercised exercisable options divided by total outstanding shares
Un options%: Unexercised un-exercisable options divided by total outstanding shares
Owner% : The sum of restricted stock grants this period plus the total number of shares held
by the CEO at year end (excluding stock options) divided by total outstanding shares
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Number of options held : Total number of unexercised options
Value of options held : Dollar value of unexercised options as reported by the company
Incentive ratio: defined by Equation (25) in Section 3.5.2
A.5 Other Control Variables:
Implicit claim: A proxy for labor intensity, equals 1 minus the ratio of gross PP&E (Compu-
stat data7) to total assets (Compustat data6)
NOA(t-1): Prior year net operating assets = Shareholders’ equity (Compustat data216) minus
cash and marketable securities (Compustat data1) plus total liabilities (Compustat data181)
at the end of fiscal year t-1, all scaled by sales of fiscal year t-1 (Compustat data12)
Litigation: An indicator set equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a high litigation risk industry
(pharmaceutical/biotechnology, SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734; computers, SIC codes 3570-
3577, 7370-7374; electronics, SIC codes 3600-3674; or retail, SIC cdoes 5200-5961), and zero
otherwise
Big 5 auditor : An indicator set equal to one if the firm is audited by a big-5 audit firm, and
zero otherwise
Delta GDP : The % change in the real GDP from the previous year
Beta: Value-weighted, firm-specific beta calculated from the contemporaneous year’s daily
returns
Time: The difference between the observation year and 1987
SOX dummy : An indicator set equal to one for post-2002 observation years, and 0 otherwise
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Table 1: Sample Selection Process 
 
ExecuComp-Compustat Universe for 1992-2006 (CEOs only) 28,559 100% 
   
Exclude Financial Firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) (4,140) (14.5%) 
Exclude missing or negative sales or assets (161) (0.6%) 
Non-missing values for all variables used in hypotheses tests (6,011) (21.0%) 
   
Total observations used in hypotheses tests 18,247 63.9% 
Unique firms 2,148  





Table2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
CEO Sample, 1992-2006 
Panel 2A: Descriptive and Independent Variables (N=18,247) 
 25th Mean Median 75th Std Dev 
Total Assets (million $) 411.2 5296.6 1137.5 3713.5 19221 
Market Cap (million $) 448.4 5895.8 1198.1 3737.8 20477 
Sales  
(million $) 
423.9 4309.7 1120.6 3367.1 12790 
ROA 3.18 5.91 6.60 10.80 13 
Leverage 0.05 0.20 0.18 0.30 0.17 
Book-to-Market 0.27 0.52 0.43 0.64 0.49 
Big 5 auditor  0.97    
Delta_GDP 2.5 3.13 3.6 4.0 1.1 
Beta 0.56 0.97 0.86 1.27 0.59 
Age  50 55.5 56 60 7.8 
Time 9 12.2 12 15 3.7 
Bonus% 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.35 0.19 
Pay-earnings sensitivity* -0.14 3.49 2.11 6.23 8.98 
Number of options 
held(thousand ) 
149.60 939.57 411.30 944.90 2432 
Value of options held 
(thousand $) 
103.75 10895.82 1612.10 7405.80 53210 
Ex_options% 0.0007 0.0073 0.0036 0.0093 0.0114 
Un_options% 0.0005 0.0048 0.0025 0.0063 0.0078 
Owner% 0.0007 0.0258 0.0030 0.0143 0.0631 
Incentive ratio 0.0877 0.2504 0.1739 0.3372 0.2274 
Implicit Claim 0.34 0.54 0.57 0.75 0.26 
NOA(t-1) 0.60 1.22 0.86 1.36 2.90 
Litigation  0.31    
SOX dummy  0.32    
 
Panel 2B: Dependent Variables (N=18,247) 
 25th Mean Median 75th Std Dev 
DA -0.047 0.016 0.001 0.046 0.231 
Abnormal prod costs -0.168 -0.071 -0.051 0.043 0.237 
Abnormal disc expenses -0.074 0.069 0.007 0.152 0.338 
 
 
*The sample size underlying the pay-earnings sensitivity variable is constrained to 
N=16,316. 
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Table 3: Correlation Table (CEO sample, 1992-2006, N=18,247 except for pay-earnings sensitivity, where N=16,316) 
The upper-right triangle shows Pearson, the lower-left triangle shows Spearman. *** indicates p-value<0.0001, ** indicates p-value<0.001, * indicates p-value<0.01 
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Table 4: Multiple Regression Results On Discretionary Accruals 
 
CEO Sample, 1992-2006  
(We use firm-CEO clustered standard errors to compute the reported t-statistics) 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
DA  
 N=18247 N=16316 











































    




























































































































































































































Adjusted R-squared 0.0095 0.0096 0.0095 0.0095 0.0100 0.0099 0.0097 0.0097 
F-statistic*  
*all reported F-statistics 



























Table 5: Multiple Regression Results On Abnormal Expenses 
 
Panel A: CEO Sample, 1992-2006 
(We use firm-CEO clustered standard errors to compute the reported t-statistics) 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Production Costs  
 N=18247 N=16316 











































    




























































































































































































































Adjusted R-squared 0.0495 0.0492 0.0533 0.0526 0.0496 0.0495 0.0525 0.0522 
F-statistic*  
*all reported F-statistics 
























Panel B: CEO Sample, 1992-2006 
(We use firm-CEO clustered standard errors to compute the reported t-statistics) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses  
 N=18247 N=16316 













































    




























































































































































































































Adjusted R-squared 0.0569 0.0562 0.0570 0.0563 0.0519 0.0518 0.0519 0.0516 
F-statistic*  
*all reported F-statistics 



















Table 6: Earnings Management Suspects Analysis 
Suspects are derived from 18,247 CEO sample. The firm-year is identified as a “suspect” if 
analysts forecasts error falls between zero and one cent per share. The analyst forecast error is 
defined as the difference between actual EPS and the median of all analysts’ final forecasts 
outstanding prior to the earnings announcement date. We use firm-CEO clustered standard errors 
to compute the reported t-statistics. 
 




Abnormal Prod Costs 
(N=2,716) 
Dependent Variable=  
Abnormal Disc Exp 
(N=2,716) 






































































































































































































































Table 7: Robustness Checks  
 




 Dependent Variable = 
DA 
 N=18247 N=16316 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0104 0.0104 0.0102 0.0103 0.0109 0.0109 0.0106 0.0105 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Production Costs  
 N=18247 N=16316 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0504 0.0500 0.0540 0.0533 0.0505 0.0504 0.0534 0.0530 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
 N=18247 N=16316 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




























Panel B: Excluding CEOs Close To Retirement  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
DA 
 N=15196 N=13515 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0093 0.0093 0.0103 0.0103 0.0097 0.0095 0.0097 0.0095 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Production Costs  
 N=15196 N=13515 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0510 0.0505 0.0567 0.0564 0.0514 0.0511 0.0547 0.0547 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
 N=15196 N=13515 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 































Panel C: Excluding First-Year CEOs 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
DA 
 N=13858 N=12525 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0089 0.0089 0.0086 0.0087 0.0088 0.0087 0.0085 0.0085 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Production Costs  
 N=13858 N=12525 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0485 0.0485 0.0513 0.0510 0.0487 0.0490 0.0511 0.0511 
 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
 N=13858 N=12525 


















Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0495 0.0495 0.0492 0.0491 0.0464 0.0467 0.0460 0.0462 
 
 
 
 
